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White House Amps Up Pressure on Russia

The White House marked the anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine with a raft of spending, tariffs, sanctions and export controls aimed at Russia and her enablers.

Tariffs on Steel, Aluminum & Chemicals.

President Biden raised tariffs on most metal and metal products – doubling them from 35 to 70 percent. Further tariffs were increased on additional Russian products to 35 percent, including chemicals and minerals.

The actions increased tariffs on Russian aluminum pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. Along with the second round of tariff increases on certain Russian products under the Suspending Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus Act **these actions will increase tariffs on Russian aluminum up to 270 percent**, according to a statement from Commerce Secretary Raimondo.

Funding Increased

Additional funding announced Friday included **$9.9 billion in grants for healthcare, education, and emergency services.** This budget support is being disbursed via the World Bank's Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) mechanism on a reimbursement basis once expenses have been verified.

Editor: Frank Ruffing +1.703.283.5220. fruffing@traderegs.com

The Department of Energy continues its support for the country's electrical grid with additional shipments of switchgear, transmission and generation equipment, and **$250 million in additional emergency energy assistance "to help Ukraine further strengthen its grid."** Along with the Ukrainian aid, the White House announced **$300 million in emergency energy assistance for Moldova**, working to increase local electric power generation, provide fiscal support, and improve interconnectivity between Moldova and the European Union.

FDP/EAR99 Export Controls Expanded

The Commerce Department announced two new rules, one to broaden the industry reach of earlier sanctions, as well as measures to address directly Russian use of Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the conflict.

"Export Control Measures on Iran Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to Address Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Their Use by Russia Against Ukraine" [Rule]

imposes new export control measures on Iran in order to address the use of Iranian UAVs by Russia in its ongoing war against Ukraine by:

- **Imposing license requirements for a subset of generally low-technology ("EAR99") items**, including semiconductors that are destined for Iran, regardless of whether a U.S. person is involved in the transaction.

- **Establishes a new list (Supplement No. 7 to part 746)** identifying these EAR99 items by HTS-6 Code to allow BIS and other U.S. government agencies to track and quantify these exports.

- **Creates a new "Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) Rule"** specific to Iran for items in certain categories of the Commerce Control List and EAR99 items identified in the new supplement.

- **Revises the existing Russia/Belarus FDP rule to cover EAR99 items** that have been found in UAVs contain parts and components branded U.S. or U.S.-origin (although they may not actually be U.S. branded or U.S.-origin) which will help to ensure that U.S. products are not available for shipment to Iran for use in the manufacture of UAVs being used by Russia in Ukraine.

These controls are in addition to BIS's action on January 31, 2023, which added seven Iranian entities involved in the manufacture of UAVs to the Entity List as Russian 'Military End Users,' thereby subjecting them to some of the most comprehensive export restrictions under the EAR, including on foreign-produced items under the Russia/Belarus Military End User FDP rule.

"Implementation of Additional Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and Refinements to Existing Controls" [Rule]

revises the EAR to enhance the existing sanctions against Russia and Belarus by expanding the scope of the Russian and Belarusian industry sector restrictions (oil and gas production; commercial and industrial items; chemical and biological precursors) and the 'luxury goods' sanctions to better align them with the controls that have been implemented by U.S. allies and partners imposing substantially similar controls on Russia and Belarus. This rule also refines other existing controls on Russia and Belarus that were imposed in response to the February 2022 invasion.

Entity List Expanded

Commerce is adding 86 entities under 89 entries (due to some entities operating in multiple countries) to the Entity List for a variety of reasons related to their activities in support of Russia's defense-industrial sector and war effort. Seventy-nine of the entities are added under the country heading of Russia, five are listed under the country heading of China, two are based in Canada, and France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands each have one entry. Several of the entities in these countries are subsidiaries of entities based in China and Russia. [FR 2023-04099] and [FR 2023-03929]

OFAC Actions

Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Russia-related

- General License 8F, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Energy,"
- General License 13D, "Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024,"
- General License 60, "Authorizing the Wind Down and Rejection of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on February 24, 2023,",
- and General License 61, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on February 24, 2023."
- Additionally, OFAC is issuing five associated Frequently Asked Questions (1114-1118).
- OFAC is also publishing a Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 14024.
- OFAC is also imposing sanctions on 22 individuals and 83 entities

While Russian banks representing over 80 percent of total Russian banking sector assets are already subject to U.S and international sanctions, OFAC today is designating over a dozen financial institutions in Russia, including one of the top-ten largest banks by asset value.

OFAC is enhancing and expanding its use of Russia-related sanctions authorities by issuing a determination that **identifies the metals and mining sector** of the Russian Federation economy pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024. This action complements existing provisions for sanctions against those that operate or have operated in the quantum computing, accounting, trust and corporate formation, management consulting, aerospace, marine, electronics, financial services, technology, and defense and related materiel sectors of the Russian Federation economy.

Entities named include firms that produce or import specialized, high-technology equipment used by Russian defense entities and companies that make advanced materials used in Russian weapons systems, notably carbon-fiber materials.

Individuals named included Swiss-Italian businessman Walter Moretti and several German and Swiss associates alleged to have covertly procured sensitive Western technologies and equipment for Russian intelligence services and the Russian military, including hydraulic presses, armament packages, and armor plating. Moretti and his associates have also procured equipment for Russia’s nuclear weapons laboratories.

G7 Leaders Establish Enforcement Coordination Mechanism, Dodge Diamond Decision

In a joint statement Friday G7 leaders announced theor intention to create a formal enforcement mechanism, and vowed to take further measures, though in a nod to Antwerp, they only promised to “work collectively on further measures on Russian diamonds, including rough and polished ones, working closely to engage key partners.

“We will maintain, fully implement and expand the economic measures we have already imposed, including by preventing and responding to evasion and circumvention through the establishment of an Enforcement Coordination Mechanism to bolster compliance and enforcement of our measures and deny Russia the benefits of G7 economies.

“We call on third-countries or other international actors who seek to evade or undermine our measures to cease providing material support to Russia’s war, or face severe costs. To deter this activity around the world, we are taking actions against third-country actors materially supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. We also commit to further aligning measures, such as transit or services bans, including to prevent Russian circumvention.

“We will adopt further measures to prevent Russia from accessing inputs that support its military and manufacturing sectors, including, among others, industrial machinery, tools, construction equipment, and other technology Russia is exploiting to rebuild its war machine. Noting than “Russia bears full responsibility for the war and the damage it has caused, including to Ukraine’s critical infrastructure<” the leaders vowed to continue to freeze sovereign assets until a resolution is reached.

BIS Finalizes Wassenaar Implementation

The December 2021 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA) Plenary meeting made certain decisions affecting the WA control lists, which BIS is now implementing via amendments to the Commerce Control List.

On August 15, 2022, BIS published a final rule that implemented some of these decisions by adding to the CCL four technologies that met the criteria for emerging or foundational technologies under Section 1758 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA).

This final rule implements the remaining controls agreed to during the December 2021 WA Plenary meeting by revising the CCL, as well as certain EAR provisions, including License Exception Adjusted Peak Performance (APP).

This final rule also makes corrections to align the scope of Significant Item (SI) license requirements throughout the EAR and makes a revision to License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA). [88 FR 12108]

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Raimondo Lays Out CHIPS Goals

Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo laid out the Administration’s goals for revitalizing US production of semiconductor chips to eliminate US dependence on imports. Current US dependence on imported chips is both an economic and national security concern, she said in a speech to students at Georgetown University.

Those goals will be carried out under the CHIPS Act, an embrace of industrial policy by both the Administration and Congress. The act allocates $39 billion for manufacturing incentives to encourage US companies to build and expand domestic semiconductor production. Commerce will launch its first application for CHIPS funding, focused on commercial manufacturing facilities, next week.

Ms. Raimondo outlined the goals she hopes to achieve by 2030. First, America will design and produce the world's most advanced chips domestically. The United States will have at least two new large-scale clusters of leading-edge logic fabs. "Each cluster will include a robust supplier ecosystem, R&D facilities to continuously innovate new process technologies and specialized infrastructure," she said.

In addition, the United States will develop multiple high-volume advanced packaging facilities and become a global leader in packaging technologies. US-based fabs also will produce advanced memory chips on economically competitive terms, she said.

"The United States will strategically increase its production capacity for the current-generation and mature-node chips most critical to our economic and national security. These are the chips that go into cars, medical devices, and many of our defense capabilities," according to Ms. Raimondo.

On Sanctions Bus or In the Dust - Adeyemo

Countries and firms who wish to trade with the US and EU will have to comply with sanctions regimes, including expanded dual-use restrictions on Russia, according to Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo. In a presentation at the Council for Foreign Relations Tuesday, the number two treasury official discussed allied measures, their impact, and previewed further actions to expect. [edited for brevity]

"The first prong of our economic strategy is to deny the Kremlin's ability to use the money they have to buy the weapons they need. And the second is to reduce the revenues that President Putin can use to fund his war of choice and prop up the Russian economy. Put simply, we're making the Kremlin choice between funding its illegitimate war and propping up its economy harder each day. The Kremlin's choice to spend the country savings can hide the damage for now, but our actions are forcing Russia to mortgage its economic future to save face today.

"Looking to China is not a solution for Russia's challenges. While we are concerned about Russia's deepening ties with China, Beijing cannot give the Kremlin what it does not have, because China does not produce advanced semiconductors Russia needs, and nearly 40% of the less advanced microchips Russia's receiving from China are defective.

"Going forward, the breadth of this coalition is what will enable us to continue to isolate Russia. We will force those that fail to implement our sanctions and export controls to choose between their economic ties with a coalition of countries that represent 50% of GDP, or providing material support to Russia, an economy that is becoming more isolated every day. One year into the conflict, Russia's economy looks more like Iran and Venezuela's than a member of the G20.

Enforcement Focus

"In addition, we and our allies are planning to launch a renewed effort to rigorously enforce the sanctions and export controls we've already put in place. Our approach to countering evasion will focus on three elements.

The first, consistent with our overall approach, will be to work closely with our allies and partners, especially in the G7 and EU. We will use sanctions, export controls and other tools to prevent the Kremlin from using the money they have to purchase the weapons and goods they need to fight this war of choice.

The second element of this effort is to identify and shut down the specific channels through which. Russia attempts to equip and fund its military. Our counter evasion efforts will deny Russia access to the dual use goods being used for the war and cut off these repurposed manufacturing facilities from the inputs they need to fill Russia's production gaps.

"The final element of our approach will be to put pressure on companies in jurisdictions we know are allowing or facilitating evasion. We have seen troubling patterns in several countries, including several Russian neighbors, where the Kremlin has deepened its financial ties and trade flows. As other markets have been closed off, we are providing intelligence and actionable information to enable countries to stamp out sanctions evasion in these jurisdictions.

"Officials from the US and the governments of our coalition partners are also engaging with companies and banks in these jurisdictions to tell them directly that if they choose to not enforce our sanctions and export controls, we will cut them off from access to our markets and financial systems.

Call to Choose

"Fundamentally, we are all parts of the global economy and that is part of the rules based order that was created after World War Two. Russia has violated the sovereignty of another country and therefore they should not be able to reap the benefits of being part of the international system.

"In my conversations with foreign countries, when I go to talk to them about their plans to continue to participate in buying arms from Russia, they all are skeptical because **they both don't think the Russia can produce enough arms, and they've also seen how Russian arms have performed on the battlefield.**

"And our message to those countries that are not already sanctioned by the international community, countries that may be playing a role in transhipment, is a simple one. Do you think that your country's economic interest are better furthered by having a relationship with Russia, economy that is relatively small in comparison to the economies of our coalition? Because fundamentally **the choice we're going to give you is that you can provide material support to Russia or you can continue to do business with our economies. You can't continue to do both** and that's a choice that we think companies in these countries are going to see as an easy one.

"Ultimately this is not about the United States and China. It is really about the coalition and our interest in making sure that Russia's invasion of Ukraine ends, and fundamentally for China, for the companies in China, for the individuals in China, the economic relationship with the EU, the United States, with Japan is more important than the economic relationship with Russia.

"Fundamentally, we think that like any other jurisdiction. **China has to make choices about what they are willing to do and whether they want to be part of the global system that represents 50% of the**

global economy, or whether they want to strengthen their ties with Russia. Ultimately, the key to the system holding together is that the benefits outweigh the detractions.

Industry Collaboration Drove Oil Price Cap

While traditionally we've had sanctions worked through banks and financial, the financial industry, this is the first time we've implemented anything like this. The most important thing we did in developing the price cap was our engagement with industry, both to help them understand what we're trying to accomplish, and for them to help us understand how best to do it.

The most important lesson from this is that, as we rely more on the private sector, a key part for us is going to be the ongoing dialogue we have with them in terms of how best to design our tools in a way that makes it easy for them to participate. Helping us to enforce them.

Sanctions Preparations

Secretary Yellen asked me to undertake [a Sanctions Review] when I came into office. I talked to people like my foreign counterparts about what worked and what hadn't worked. Fundamentally, that review ended in the fall of 2021. Two months later, as we started to see the intelligence above about Ukraine, Russia building up troops at the border of Ukraine, I went back to those same counterparts and said we need to start planning for this contingency. And we took what we learned from that review and applied it here.

And one of the most important lessons was that the best way to protect against not only the overuse but not using them in a targeted way was to do it in a multilateral fashion. That's why we work so quick closely with our allies and partners. I think one of the most important things that we've learned from Russia's invasion of Ukraine is a lesson that we have known since World War Two, which is that one of the key strengths of the United States is the fact that we have a deep history of working closely with our allies and partners to accomplish not just our national security objectives, but our economic objectives as well.

I'm not gonna preview any sanctions today, but as the president said, we plan to announce additional sanctions that will look to meet our two objectives, which are to go after the military industrialized complex that Russia has and also to cut off their sources of revenue going forward.

A big piece of what we're going to do using sanctions is also go after the networks that are helping to facilitate evasion. So in the coming days, you'll see additional actions that we'll take not just here in the United States, but to my larger point, in collaboration and coordination with our allies and partners around the world who are part of this coalition

My expectation is that the European Union, the United States, the rest of the G7 will act together to hold accountable any country, any company, any individual that provides material support to Russia going forward. We've already used and the tools we would use are the same tools we would use in any jurisdiction, which includes sanctions, which we've already demonstrating a willingness to use, but also furthering our export controls.

What we're going to do is further tighten our export controls and sanctions to go after some of these dual use goods that we know are furthering their war effort. It's not only an action we're going to take here in the United States. We know that the European Union is committed to taking alongside us.

For any jurisdiction, being China, be it the UAE, be it a country that is neighboring Russia, the choice they're going to have to make is not only with regard to their economic relationship with the US, but their economic relationship with the other members of our coalition, who also feel strongly about the fact that the most important thing that we can do is help Ukraine end this war as quickly as possible.

WTO: Trade Flows Fine Despite Ukraine

A new information note issued by the World Trade Organization yesterday on the impact of the war in Ukraine on global trade suggests some interesting findings, especially that the war appears to have had little or no impact on global trade because of “alternative sources of supply.”

In the face of the emerging fragmentation of the global trading system with increasing recourse to reshoring, friend-shoring and industrial trade policies based on hundreds of billions of dollars by the world’s largest trading country, the report calls for strengthening the multilateral trading system.

Regardless of the ongoing efforts by some powerful members who seem less concerned about the future of the multilateral trading system because of their increased emphasis on security-driven trade coalitions of willing members, the WTO note reckons that the system has still some oxygen to pump into global trade, said people familiar with the note.

According to the note which is titled “One Year of War in Ukraine: Assessing the Impact on Global Trade and Development”, global trade growth in 2022 was above the WTO trade forecast of 3 percent growth issued last April.

Contrary to the media reports that there has been a noticeable disruption in global supply chains because of a new wave of alleged trade sanctions on countries, the note states global supply chains appear to have performed well, as confirmed by the 4 percent year-on-year growth of trade in intermediate goods in the second quarter of 2022.

Trade Flows Still Open

“Global trade has held up well in the face of the war in Ukraine. Despite the devastation we have seen one year on, trade flows remained open,” according to the note.

“We have not seen the worst predictions foreseen at the onset of the war,” says the WTO’s new Chief Economist Ralph Ossa. Early last year WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala expressed sharp concern over the Ukraine war and its likely impact on wheat, edible oils, barley and fertilizers. Contrary to dire predictions, the WTO’s note maintains that “sharply higher food prices and supply shortages have not materialized thanks to the openness of the multilateral trading system and the cooperation governments have committed to at the WTO. ”

“Resilience will ultimately be best served by fostering deeper and more diverse international markets, anchored in open and predictable trade rules,"”Mr Ossa argued.

The note says that trade in products significantly affected by the war and trade by the most exposed countries were remarkably resilient.

According to the note, trading partners found alternative sources to fill in the gaps for most products affected by the conflict, such as wheat, maize, sunflower products, fertilizer, fuels and palladium – a rare earth mineral used in catalytic converters for cars.

It says that prices for goods greatly affected by the war rose less than expected at the beginning of the war. Among products most affected by the war, prices increased 4.4 percent for palladium and 24.2 percent for maize. While these price increases are substantial, they are significantly lower than the gloomiest predictions, the note suggested.

In the case of cascading export restrictions on food, the note says prices for wheat could have increased by up to 85 percent in some low-income regions compared to the actual increase of 17 percent. The note acknowledges that Ukrainian exports collapsed by 30 percent in 2022 in value terms.

Exports of cereal, which are central to the food security of many African economies, declined by 14.9 percent forcing these economies to adjust their sourcing patterns.

Ethiopia, for example, which used to rely on Ukraine and Russia for 45 percent of its wheat imports, reacted by increasing purchases from other producers including the United States, with shipments up 20 percent in volume terms and Argentina, which supplied 21 percent of Ethiopia's imported wheat, up from zero in the previous year.

Despite the burden on Russia's economy from economic sanctions, Russia’s exports expanded by 15.6 percent in value terms because of an increase in prices particularly for fuels, fertilizers and cereals.

The note adds that estimates suggest Russia's export volume may have declined slightly. It stresses that trade flows are sharply down for industrial goods such as motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals and aircraft, where sanctions are more restrictive.

USDA: Farm Exports to Fall in 2023

Farm exports will be lower in the current fiscal year , according to USDA’s revised agricultural trade forecast released yesterday. USDA is forecasting exports will fall to $184.5 billion while imports will hit a record high of $199 billion. The forecast reflects slowing global economic growth, a relatively strong US dollar, softening commodity prices and lower export volumes for some commodities.

The largest declines in fiscal 2023 agricultural exports are forecast for corn, sorghum and cotton, which are all lowered on volume and in the case of cotton, also on price. This in part reflects lower forecast US production of these crops in 2022/23 relative to the previous year, as well as soft global demand for cotton given the broader macroeconomic situation, according to USDA.

Increasing competition from other suppliers, particularly for corn and cotton, also contribute to the lower forecast. Fiscal year 2023 exports for most other commodity sectors are expected to be lower, although in many cases from record levels in fiscal 2022.

The fiscal year 2023 export forecast, if realized, would still be the second highest on record, according to Mr. Meyer. China remains the top destination for US agricultural exports, although exports are projected to fall by $2.4 billion from fiscal 2022's record of $36.4 billion, reflecting reduced sorghum, cotton and tree nut exports.

US farm exports to Mexico and Canada are projected to fall slightly, with a larger decline in exports to Canada due to reduced corn sales. This would make Mexico the second largest US agricultural export market if the forecast is realized.

Exports to Japan – the third largest market for US farm exports – are projected to fall by $1.2 billion, due to lower expected corn, beef and tree nut sales. Exports to the EU also are expected to fall slightly, while the forecast for exports to South Korea is on par with FY 2022's levels.

Imports, meanwhile are forecast at a new record of $199 billion, up 3 percent from fiscal 2022, which was the previous record.The import forecast reflects the relative strength of the US dollar, continued strength in import growth and a somewhat improved outlook for the US economy for 2023 relative to what was forecast last year.

Horticultural products remain the largest import category, forecast at $99.9 billion, or nearly half of the total. While fruits, vegetables, and tree nuts make up almost half of this category, the rest is comprised of other horticultural products, a category which includes a wide variety of goods. Over half of these other horticultural products are distilled spirits, wine and beer, followed by miscellaneous horticultural products, such as processed foods and ingredients, as well as essential oils, nursery and cut flowers.

Mexico is forecast to remain the top supplier of agricultural products to the United States, followed by Canada and the EU.

USDA noted that there are market and policy uncertainties that could affect the trade forecast for 2023, including the continued impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on global grain and oilseed markets. Mexico's recent decision to ban certain types of biotech corn, also creates uncertainty and can impact the trade outlook, Mr. Meyer said.

*** Briefs ***

USMCA / Mexican Corn Standoff Inevitable: Vilsack

The United States almost certainly is headed toward launching a formal dispute with Mexico over its planned ban on biotech corn, **Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack** said Thursday. Unless Mexico reverses its position against biotech products, a US-Mexico-Canada dispute is inevitable, Mr. Vilsack told reporters on the sidelines of USDA's annual outlook conference.

"This is not a situation that lends itself to compromise," he stated.

US and Mexican trade officials are about to held a series of meeting to exchange information on Mexico's proposed ban and US views. If those talks do not lead to a resolution, the next step is the USMCA dispute settlement process, Mr. Vilsack said. Washington cannot compromise on the ban because a "science-based, rules-based system" is a fundamental principle of trade, he stated. Accepting a non-scientific approach would lead to a "very slippery slope" that could result in other trade partners taking similar stands against GMO products.

"We're just not going to go down that road," Mr. Vilsack said.

Speaking at the USDA conference, **Chief US Agriculture Negotiator Doug McKalip** said that the Administration has requested additional details from Mexico about the decree and recent proposed changes. Mexico has provided those details, which currently are being examined by US officials. If US concerns cannot be resolved, "all options are on the table," he said. The US side is not asking for new commitments from Mexico – just that it comply with the obligations it already agreed to under the USMCA. USTR also continues to press Canada for access to its dairy market, as required under the USMCA, according to Mr. McKalip.

Ajay Banga Nominated as World Bank Chief, replacing outgoing head David Malpass. Mr. Banga currently serves as Vice Chairman at buyout group and venture capitalists General Atlantic, becoming an advisor to the company's climate-focused fund, BeyondNetZero, at its inception in 2021. Previously, he was President and CEO of Mastercard. Mr. Banga also is chairman of Exor, the Agnelli Family's holdings and independent director at Singapore sovereign wealth fund Temasek. He is a past member of the President's Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations.

Christopher Wilson Named Assistant USTR for Japan, Korea and APEC Affairs. Mr. Wilson served most recently as assistant USTR for South and Central Asia, a role that will be taken over by Brendan Lynch on an acting basis.

The Office of Japan, Korea, and APEC Affairs is responsible for addressing US-Japan bilateral trade issues, monitoring Japan's compliance with bilateral and international trade treaties and coordinating with Japanese counterparts on global trade issues of mutual interest. It also monitors Korea's implementation of its commitments under the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement, as well as ensuring Korea's compliance with various bilateral trade agreements and developing US trade priorities under the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum and its 21 member economies.

Mr. Wilson joined USTR in 2000. From 2014-2018, he represented USTR in Geneva, Switzerland as the U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the World Trade Organization.

China Coercion Bill Introduced

Legislation providing the President with new tools to provide rapid economic support to allies facing economic coercion from China has been introduced in the House.

The Countering Economic Coercion Act of 2023 (HR 1135) is the House companion to legislation introduced earlier in the Senate. Sponsoring the House bill are House Foreign Affairs Committee ranking Democrat Gregory Meeks (NY), House Rules Committee Chairman Tom Cole (R-Okla) and Rep. Ami Bera (D-Calif). The sponsors said they hope to see the legislation move through Congress with bipartisan support.

The legislation would authorize the President to:

- seek Congressional appropriations to support foreign aid, export financing, and sovereign loan guarantees to foreign partners that are subject to economic coercion;
- expedite export licensing decisions and regulatory processes to facilitate trade with affected foreign partners;
- decrease duties on non-import-sensitive goods imported by the United States from foreign partners that are subject to coercion to make up for lost exports;
- increase duties on imports from foreign adversaries committing economic coercion against United States partners and allies an
- waive certain policy requirements to facilitate export financing, allowing the US private sector to meet opportunities in foreign economies suffering from coercion.

*** Calendar ***

CBP hosts trade outreach events via free webinars Beginning February through September 2023, each webinar will commence at 1:30 p.m. Eastern time and run for about an hour *(click title for link).*

"Let's Get Informed!" - Unformed/Formed Uppers	*Tuesday, February 28, 2023, at 1:30 p.m. EST*
Global Business Identifier (GBI) Initiative	*Tuesday, February 28, 2023, at 3:00 p.m. EST*
Forced Labor Technical Expo (in-person)	*Tuesday, March 14, 2023, at 8:00 a.m. EST*
Classification of Stamps of Heading 9704	*Tuesday, March 21, 2023, at 1:30 p.m. EST*

USDA's 99th annual Agricultural Outlook Forum (AOF), will be held in-person at the Crystal City Gateway Marriott on *February 23-24, 2023*, and all sessions will be livestreamed on a virtual platform. More than 30 sessions and 100 agriculture leaders and subject matter experts will discuss key issues impacting the sector [Info]

WITA 2023 Congressional Trade Agenda. *Friday, March 3, 2023. 9:30 am - 11:00 am ET. Featured Speakers:*
Sally Laing, Chief International Trade Counsel, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Democratic Staff
Mayur Patel, Chief Counsel, International Trade, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Republican Staff.
Josh Snead, Republican Chief Trade Counsel, Trade Subcommittee, House Ways and Means Cttee.
Alexandra Whittaker, Democratic Chief Trade Counsel; Staff Director Trade Subcommittee, House Ways and Means Cttee. Ronald Reagan Building & International Trade Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC [Registration]

EU-US Trade & Technology Council: WG10 Roundtable on due diligence

3 March 2023, 12:30 CET - 3 March 2023, 19:30 CET [hybrid register] TTC Working Group 10 will host a roundtable discussion. [event website]. **Register** [register] by Tuesday 28 February 2022, 18:00 CET / 12:00 EST.

The Forced Labor Technical Expo Tuesday, March 14, 2023 *(opening remarks & industry presentations, including a DHS-led panel discussion, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., EST), and* Wednesday, March 15, 2023 *(opening remarks & industry presentations, including a CBP-led panel discussion, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., EST).* CBP welcomes industry event attendance as well as stakeholders impacted by the need to comply with UFLPA and §19 U.S.C. 1307. The event will be held at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center (RRB), 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Atrium Concourse Level, Washington, DC. Attendees should register through the Trade Events page. https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor-technical-expo-2023 [88 FR 9891]

Dear Readers

This week we are making the transition from our design and online presence of the past three decades, to introduce a fresh, timely and accessible format.

We will continue to distribute your weekly letter, in a more concise, mobile-ready manner,

As well, we furnish timely updates and analysis throughout the week on our redesigned website www.wttlonline.com

Predating the World Wide Web by five years (1985), the Washington Tariff and Trade Letter and sister publications are committed to remaining a valuable resource for the trade community.

Tips, comments or suggestions? Please let us know.

Kind regards,

Frank Ruffing, Editor

+1.703.283.5220.
fruffing@traderegs.com